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This paper explores official trade data to identify patterns of smuggling in international trade. Our 
main measure of interest is the difference in matched partner trade statistics, i.e., the extent to which 
the recorded export value in the source country deviates from the reported import value in the 
destination country. Analyzing 4-digit product level data for the world’s five largest importers for the 
period from 2002-2006, we find that the reporting gaps are highly correlated with the level of 
corruption in both partner countries. This finding supports the hypothesis that trade gaps partly 
represent smuggling activities.  
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1. Introduction 
In principle, international trade statistics should match so that a country’s exports to a 
particular partner are identical to the partner’s recorded imports from that supplier. In 
practice, however, these numbers differ, for various reasons. For instance, a major source of 
discrepancy is the conceptual difference in valuation. Exporting countries report the value of 
goods at the initial point of departure (fob), while import values refer to the value at the point 
of final destination, thereby including the costs of freight and insurance (cif). As a result, the 
cif/fob ratio has been frequently used in the literature as a measure of transportation costs. 
Limão and Venables (2001) provide a recent application of this approach; see Hummels and 
Lugovskyy (2006) for a detailed critique. 
Apart from the different treatment of shipping costs, however, there are also other 
methodological difficulties when exploring matched partner trade statistics. For instance, the 
correct identification of the source or destination country might be a problem. When the 
country of final destination is not known at the time of exportation, the exporter declares the 
country of last shipment; the country of final destination, in contrast, classifies its imports by 
country of origin. Another potential issue of importance is timing. Since there are often 
notable time lags between the departure and arrival of a shipment (e.g., due to long-distance 
sea cargo, a delay in customs declaration or temporary storage in a warehouse), trade could be 
recorded in different calendar years. More importantly, statistical offices in the source and 
destination country may value goods at different prices and/or exchange rates. Finally, 
recorded trade on the commodity level may differ due to the omission of individual 
transactions in one of the partner countries (e.g., because of varying trade thresholds across 
countries), the exclusion of certain product groups in a country’s trade statistics (such as 
military material or repair trade) or differences in commodity classification (e.g., a regrouping 
of a transaction into chapter 99 for reasons of confidentiality). In view of all these difficulties, 
the European Union, though aiming to reduce the declaration burden on businesses, still 
refrains from using mirror (single-flow) trade statistics.1 
Most recently, Fisman and Wei (2007) have emphasized another possible explanation 
for the observed differences in matched partner trade statistics. They argue that the gap 
between exports and imports may (partly) reflect systematic (criminal) behavior by traders. In 
particular, they argue that for products with sharp export restrictions in the source country and 
no barriers to import in the destination country, traders have a strong incentive to underreport 
                                                 
1 For an early attempt, see the European Commission’s “Simpler Legislation for the Internal 
Market (SLIM)” initiative, which is documented at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/simplification/index_en.htm. 
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exports (i.e., to smuggle the good out of the country), while properly declaring imports 
(because of no constraints for entry, in combination with the risk of seizure when there is false 
declaration). Analyzing trade gaps for a product category that is likely to display those 
characteristics, antiques of an age exceeding one hundred years (Harmonized System [HS] 
product code 9706), Fisman and Wei (2007) find that underreporting is indeed strongest for 
countries for which survey-based measures indicate a high level of corruption and, thus, 
ignorance of legal rules and procedures (also in trade) may be be relatively easy. Moreover, 
they find no such association for a product category with no (or less strict) restrictions for 
exportation, such as toys, scale models etc., puzzles, parts (HS code 9503), which appears 
reassuring. 
In this paper, we examine the discrepancies in pair-wise trade statistics for a much 
broader set of product categories. In particular, we aim to identify countries that 
systematically underreport export activities in international trade statistics and, thus, 
apparently suffer strongly from smuggling. Further, we explore differences in trade gaps 
across individual product categories. This allows analyzing, for instance, whether there are 
products other than cultural objects that are prone to illicit trade. In sum, we develop a profile 
of smuggling that identifies both major source countries and important product categories for 
smuggling. 
To preview our results, we find that pair-wise discrepancies in official trade statistics 
are highly correlated across both countries and products. Moreover, country-specific trade 
gaps are strongly associated with the level of corruption, especially in the source country. 
Product-specific trade gaps vary systematically with the level of protection in the destination 
country. These findings suggest that at least part of the discrepancy in international trade 
figures is due to smuggling.2 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
methodology and the data. Section 3 presents the empirical results, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
                                                 
2 In reality, customs offices already apply such profiles to assess risks. In the European Union, 
for example, a risk information form is used to exchange information among the customs 
administrations of member states; see 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_controls/risk_management/implementi
ng/index_en.htm. In Germany, a central office for risk analysis (Zentralstelle Risikoanalyse, 




2. Methodology and Data 
Our main measure of interest is the difference in recorded trade flows between the 
exporting and the importing country. Following Fisman and Wei (2007), we define the 
reporting gap in official trade statistics as: 
 
(1) Gapkijt = ln(1 + Importskjit) – ln(1 + Exportskijt), 
 
where Importskjit denotes country j’s imports of product k from country i in year t and Exports 
denotes the corresponding exports from i to j as recorded in the source country. 
In our empirical analysis, we aim to explain the observed variation in trade gaps. 
Fisman and Wei (2007) highlight that, for some product categories, discrepancies in trade 
statistics reflect extra-legal activities and thus are associated with measures of corruption; we 
examine the effect of various determinants on trade gaps for all types of products. In 
particular, we apply the following very general regression framework: 
 
(2) Gapkijt = α + β Xit + γ Mjt + δ Pijt + φ Zkt + εkijt , 
 
where Xit is a vector of exporter-specific variables that may be correlated with the reporting 
gap (such as, for instance, corruption), Mjt is a corresponding set of importer-specific 
attributes, Pijt collects various pair-specific variables (such as, for instance, bilateral distance 
as a proxy for transportation costs), Z is a set of product-specific controls (including, for 
instance, the tariff rate in the destination country), and ε is a well-behaved residual. We 
estimate this equation using conventional OLS with year effects, computing standard errors 
that are robust to clustering. 
Relevant country-specific attributes we consider include the level of corruption, the 
level of economic development, country size and landlockedness. Fisman and Wei (2007) 
argue that smuggling is more prevalent in countries with corrupt bureaucracies. More 
specifically, they argue that hiding exports should be easier in a country where it is customary 
to bribe government officials than in countries where export controls are strictly enforced. As 
a result, corruption in the source country should be associated with a larger underreporting of 
exports, thereby widening trade gaps in pair-wise trade statistics. Similarly, though working in 
the opposite direction (that is, reducing the trade gap), the incentive to properly declare 
imports is lower when it is relatively easy to persuade customs officials in the destination 
country to disregard the law. In addition, smuggling may be related to a country’s level of 
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economic development. Poor countries often have a less effective customs administration; 
they also produce less reliable official statistics. Moreover, low income may force people into 
illegal activities. The geographic size of a country may be another proxy for the effectiveness 
of border controls, since large countries may find it more difficult to enforce trade restrictions. 
To control for the effect of shipping costs on differences in matched partner trade statistics, 
we include a dummy variable for landlockedness. Most landlocked countries face a cost 
disadvantage in international trade, having to cope with the costs of overland transport to 
neighboring ports and the costs of crossing of at least one additional international border; see 
Radelet and Sachs (1998). In addition, we include two country-pair specific measures of 
transportation costs that are standard in the ‘gravity’ model of trade: the bilateral distance 
between the two trading partners, and a dummy variable for sharing a common land border. 
Finally, we enter some measures of product-specific characteristics, such as the applied tariff 
and the value-to-weight ratio. Low levels of trade protection possibly imply fewer incentives 
for misreporting; smuggling may be particularly attractive for products with high value-to-
weight ratios. 
Our data is mainly taken from standard sources. Similar to Fisman and Wei (2007), we 
use the United Nations Comtrade database to obtain exports and imports data at the 4-digit 
(HS) product level. The database contains detailed (annual) trade statistics reported by 
statistical authorities of close to 200 countries or territories and standardized by the UN 
Statistics Division; we examine the records of shipments to the five largest importing nations 
in the world (United States, Germany, China, United Kingdom and Japan).3 At the 4-digit 
level, there are more than 1,200 product categories. We use the most recent commodity 
classification (HS-2002); the data are available for five years, covering the period from 2002 
to 2006. 
Our measure of corruption is taken from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators project; see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007). This project combines 
various variables into an aggregate “control of corruption” score; the score lies between -2.5 
and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes (i.e., a less corrupt bureaucracy). 
As a check, we also use the Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International; 
see http://www.transparency.org. Other data are mainly obtained from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators and the CIA World Factbook. Average import tariffs at the 4-
                                                 
3 See Table I.8 of the WTO’s International Trade Statistics 2007, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2007_e/its07_world_trade_dev_e.pdf. 
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digit level are provided by the UNCTAD/WTO International Trade Centre (and obtained from 
http://www.macmap.org). A data appendix describes the variables and sources in more detail. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
We begin by exploring the full sample of annual country pair-specific trade 
differences at the 4-digit product level. For illustration, Table 1 lists the five largest 
(percentage) discrepancies in bilateral trade by importer. Interestingly, a few empirical 
regularities already emerge from this rough tabulation. For instance, most experiences where 
recorded import values strongly exceed corresponding exports appear to be concentrated in 
one single product category, ‘petroleum oils, crude’ (HS code 2709). As Yeats (1978) notes, 
this discrepancy is often due to problems in valuing petroleum, and the frequent diversion of 
petroleum exports from its original destination en route. For other product categories, in 
contrast, export values (despite disregarding transportation costs) are considerably larger than 
imports in mirror statistics; these categories include ‘other aircraft (for example, helicopters, 
aeroplanes), spacecraft’ (8802), ‘cruise ships, excursion boats, ferry-boats, cargo ships, barges 
and similar vessels for the transport of persons or goods’ (8901) and ‘gold (including gold 
plated with platinum)’ (7108). A possible explanation is that, especially for bulky items with 
low-frequency trading, the time lag between exportation and importation may be of particular 
importance. Also, to the extent that there is any geographical pattern in misreporting, over-
invoicing of exports appears to be a more frequent problem in trade with neighboring 
countries. 
To further analyze the geographical pattern in misreporting, we examine differences in 
trade gaps across countries in more detail. In particular, we aim to identify countries that 
consistently understate their exports (and, thus, appear to be particularly prone to smuggling). 
In a first exercise, we compute for each exporter the average trade gap across all products. 
Since there may be sizable product-specific differences in reported trade values between the 
exporting and the importing country, taking the arithmetic mean of these reporting gaps over 
often hundreds of products is a simple way to (hopefully) identify country-specific differences 
in trade reporting. Table 2 lists the five countries with the largest average percentage share of 
missing exports by importer. As shown, we find indeed a strong and consistent mismatch in 
international trade statistics, with continuous underreporting, for instance, by Equatorial 
Guinea, Indonesia and the Philippines. More importantly, reviewing the full distribution of 
exporting countries, it turns out that the extent to which countries tend to misreport exports is 
broadly similar across trade destinations. The correlation of exporter-specific average trade 
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gaps across importing countries is astonishingly high, on the order of about 0.9. Table 3 
reports a set of simple bivariate correlation coefficients; (unreported) Spearman rank 
correlations provide similar results. 
 
3.1 Benchmark results 
To analyze the country pair-specific discrepancies in matched partner trade statistics in 
more detail, we next apply rigorous econometric techniques. In particular, we are interested in 
the extent to which gaps in official trade statistics are perhaps the result of illicit trade. Fisman 
and Wei (2007) argue that, for selected product categories, the difference in recorded trade 
flows is due to smuggling. For antiquities, they find that the extent of underreporting of 
exports is closely related to the (perceived) level of corruption in the exporting country. We 
examine whether this association also holds for the whole range of products traded 
internationally. 
Table 4 presents our benchmark results. In the first column, we report the estimation 
results for the most basic specification of equation (2); that is, we regress the observed 
average pair-wise trade gap on our variable of interest, corruption in the exporting country, 
and add a comprehensive set of importer and year fixed effects. The estimated coefficient on 
the corruption measure is -1.97, with a robust standard error of 0.21. This coefficient is not 
only consistent with the hypothesis that more corruption (i.e., a lower score) is associated with 
a broader under-reporting of exports; with a t-statistic of 9.4, the coefficient is also highly 
significant statistically. Moreover, the effect is economically large; a better corruption rating 
by one index point is associated with a lower trade gap by about 2 percentage points, thereby 
reducing the discrepancy in corresponding trade figures by about one-half. The estimated 
coefficient is even slightly larger in magnitude than the analogous estimate for antiquities in 
Fisman and Wei (2007). Overall, our default specification fits the data reasonably well, 
explaining almost 20 percent of the variation in trade gaps.  
A graphical illustration of the association between missing exports and exporter 
corruption is provided in Figure 1. The figure presents, for each importer separately, scatter 
plots of the bilateral trade gap against the measure of corruption in the exporting country in 
2004. Confirming our estimation results, the graphs show a clearly negative correlation. 
Taken together, our results suggest that smuggling activities are not restricted to a small set of 
products where there is a strong asymmetry in reporting incentives, but rather seem to affect a 
large range of products dependent on the norms of corruption in the exporting country. 
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3.2 Robustness analysis 
In the remaining columns of Table 4, we present a number of sensitivity checks. We 
begin our robustness analysis by adding various control variables that may affect the bilateral 
gap in trade reporting. In column (2), we include various measures for transportation costs. 
Except for landlockedness, which is found to be associated, if anything, with smaller (instead 
of larger) trade gaps, the coefficients take on the expected sign; the discrepancy between 
recorded exports and imports grows with the geographic distance among the trading partners 
and is smaller for neighboring countries. However, only the distance variable enters the 
regression significantly different from zero. More importantly, the estimated coefficient on 
exporter corruption remains virtually unchanged with this extension. In column (3), instead of 
adding measures of shipping costs, we include potential proxies for smuggling other than 
corruption. Of these variables, the coefficient on per capita income in the exporting country is 
indeed negative and significant, indicating that poorer countries tend to understate exports. 
The negative coefficient on country size, in contrast, implies that trade gaps are on average 
larger for geographically small exporters, suggesting that possible ‘natural’ restrictions on the 
effectiveness of border controls may be of less importance for the observed discrepancies in 
corresponding trade figures. Reassuringly, our finding of a negative association between 
exporter corruption and misreporting in trade is again basically unaffected by this extension, 
though the estimated coefficient is slightly smaller in magnitude. Next, we include the two 
sets of controls jointly, without much effect. Finally, in the column on the extreme right of 
Table 4, we replace our World Bank corruption variable with a measure taken from 
Transparency International. This score is available only for a smaller number of countries. 
However, we still find a significant negative relationship between corruption in the exporting 
country and the share of exports that is also recorded in the importing country, perhaps 
reflecting the high correlation between both corruption ratings; see Figure 2 for a scatter plot. 
Table 5 presents another set of robustness checks. We divide the sample along various 
lines and report coefficient estimates on exporter corruption, obtained for these subsamples. 
In particular, we tabulate results for individual years, for separate importing countries, and for 
various groups of exporting countries. Of these perturbations, only restrictions on the sample 
of exporting countries included in the empirical analysis have a significant impact on the key 
coefficient. Not surprisingly, the effect of corruption on the discrepancy in trade statistics 
disappears for shipments from OECD member countries and trading partners nearby to 
importers (in our sample), since both groups of countries (often) have low corruption ratings. 
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In a next experiment, instead of splitting the sample, we now sizably increase the 
number of observations. More specifically, we substitute the average pair-wise trade gap 
across all traded products with individual product-specific trade gaps between pairs of 
countries. Table 6 reports the results. For this extension, the point estimate on the corruption 
measure decreases in magnitude and even loses statistical significance (though it remains 
negative). However, it seems generally difficult to explain variation in trade gaps at the 
product level. Neither the bilateral distance term remains important, nor does the size effect. 
The empirical fit of our framework is much lower; the adjusted R-squared falls to 0.09. 
Moreover, in unreported results, we find that the estimated coefficient on corruption remains 
negative and significant when the control for per capita income in the exporting country is 
dropped; that is, for the large sample of individual product-specific trade gaps by exporter, the 
effect of corruption on the reporting gap seems to work mainly through its correlation with 
income. Figure 3 graphs the association between per capita income and corruption.  
We also explore two reasonable slices of the sample; results are tabulated in the last 
two columns (on the right) of Table 6. First, we drop observations with negative trade gaps 
(i.e., where exports exceed imports). Then, we explore a sample where both partner countries, 
exporter and importer, have a data entry for a trade flow; previously we have imposed a trade 
value of zero when information from one partner was missing. As shown, both restrictions 
yield interesting results. Excluding episodes of over-reported exports improves the fit of the 
regression markedly. With this modification, many coefficients increase in size and 
significance; the adjusted R-squared jumps to 0.23. When episodes of missing trade are 
dropped, the point estimate on corruption becomes of borderline significance (with a p-value 




We have also performed a set of other extensions to identify the possible effect of 
corruption on trade. Table 7 varies our measure of trade gaps. Instead of trade values, we 
exploit information on the recorded weights and quantities of shipments. For smuggled goods, 
the choice of the trade measure should be irrelevant for the estimation results; these goods are 
moved out of the country illegally and unreported. However, if corruption mainly implies that 
customs officials are bribed to under-invoice export values, the weight and quantity of a good 
may still be properly recorded at customs which would reduce the estimated impact of 
corruption. As shown, the coefficient estimates on exporter corruption indeed decrease in 
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magnitude (by about one-third) when we substitute (nominal) trade values by real trade 
measures. Still, most estimates remain statistically different from zero at conventional levels. 
Fisman and Wei (2007) focus exclusively on trade restrictions (and the incentives to 
misreport trade) in the exporting country. A similar reasoning, however, applies for the 
importing country as well. For certain import sanctions and duties, traders may find it 
profitable to under-invoice goods (which may or may not have been properly declared in the 
source country) upon entry. As a result, while corruption in the exporting country is 
associated with larger trade gaps, we could observe the opposite effect of lower trade gaps for 
corruption in the importing country. Table 8 provides estimates for importer-specific 
determinants of pair-wise discrepancies in trade statistics; these estimates are analogues to 
Table 4. Although our sample covers only five importing countries which have, except for 
China, almost similar corruption ratings, we find convincing evidence that corruption also 
matters for imports.4 The positive coefficient indicates that a more corrupt bureaucracy in the 
importing country (that is, a lower corruption index) is associated with a smaller trade gap 
(and, thus, less recorded imports). The effect disappears once we control for other importer 
characteristics (especially country size). However, given the small number of importing 
countries in our sample, this is perhaps not terribly disturbing. 
In our final exercise, we explore differences in trade gaps across products. Fisman and 
Wei (2007) argue that one particular (4-digit) product category, antiques of an age exceeding 
one hundred years (product code 9706), exhibits specific features so that smuggling becomes 
highly attractive; exports of cultural objects is often strongly restricted, while there are no 
measurable barriers to imports. We examine, applying the same basic methodology, whether 
other product categories perhaps display similar features. Table 9 tabulates product categories 
for which we find the largest reported trade gaps. The top categories appear to differ widely 
across importers. There are only three product groups for which we observe a large share of 
underreported exports in more than one destination country. For two of these categories, 
however, ‘petroleum oils, crude’ (code 2709) and ‘commodities not specified according to 
kind’ (9999), the discrepancy is likely to be unrelated to smuggling. The third top-ranked 
category is the product category chosen by Fisman and Wei, antiquities. For this group, we 
report, for comparison, also the rank and the recording gap in other countries. Again, there are 
sizable differences across importing countries, with China even recording import values that 
are considerably smaller than worldwide reported exports (i.e., a negative trade gap). 
                                                 
4 In 2006, the World Bank corruption indices were as follows: United States 1.30; Germany 
1.78; China -0.53; United Kingdom 1.86; Japan 1.31. The average score for the full sample is 
zero. 
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Table 10 reports the pair-wise correlation coefficients that describe the full ranking of 
products. Similar to our results for exporters, we also find that product-specific trade gaps are 
significantly correlated across importers, though the correlation coefficients are much lower 
than before, especially for bilateral pairs that include China. 
Still, we aim to characterize differences in trade gaps across products. For instance, 
one measure for which we explore its association with the discrepancy between recorded 
imports and exports is the level of import protection, as proxied by the total ad valorem 
equivalent tariff. To the extent that reporting incentives matter, one would expect that traders 
report import values more correctly (and, thus, reporting gaps in trade statistics are smaller) 
when barriers to imports are low. We also exploit two other product-specific measures 
provided in the UN comtrade database: the weight and quantity of pair-wise trade. Based on 
these variables, we compute the (average) value-to-weight and value-to-quantity ratios of 
product-level trade, supposing that high value goods, such as antiquities, are more attractive 
for smuggling. 
Again, we apply a variant of (2) which includes a comprehensive set of either 
importer- or country pair-specific fixed effects to capture country (pair)-related determinants 
of trade gaps, including corruption. Table 11 presents the results. We report two sets of 
estimation results. The first two columns tabulate the estimates for individual product-level 
trade gaps; the remaining two columns show the results when trade gaps are averaged across 
exporters for individual importers and and products. We also report separate results for 
characteristics in product-level trade recorded by exporting and importing countries, 
documenting minor differences in statistical significance. Interestingly, we find strong and 
consistent evidence that trade gaps decrease with the level of import protection. The estimated 
coefficient on the import tariff is negative and highly significant in all specifications, 
supporting the view that reporting incentives measurably affect the accuracy of trade 
statistics. The estimation results for product characteristics are less convincing, possibly as a 
result of aggregation to the 4-digit product level. Specifically, our findings suggest that trade 
gaps tend to be larger, if anything, for products with low value-to-quantity ratios. Thus, it 
appears that underreporting of exports is more prevalent in bulky mass shipments, so that 
antiquities are an exception rather than the rule, an issue that deserves our future attention. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Discrepancies in international trade statistics have been frequently analyzed in the 
past. Statisticians often aim to identify (and quantify) potential reasons for the differences in 
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pair-wise trade statistics to perhaps properly adjust their national trade figures. Economists 
occasionally exploit the difference between recorded exports and imports as a proxy for 
bilateral transaction costs. 
In this paper, we examine another potential explanation for the observed discrepancy 
in trade statistics, (illegal) non-declaration. Similar to Fisman and Wei (2007) for antiquities, 
we find that the reporting gap in bilateral trade is strongly associated with the level of 
corruption, especially in the source country. In countries with corrupt bureaucracies, it should 
be easier (and perhaps even common practice) to ignore legal rules and procedures. To the 
extent that this misbehaviour also affects international trade transactions, our findings suggest 
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Table 1: Largest trade gaps, 2004 
 
 
Underreporting of exports 
 
Importer: 
USA Germany China United Kingdom Japan 
Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap 
SAU 2709 23.8 LBY 2709 22.0 PHL 8542 22.4 BWA 7102 21.5 SAU 2709 23.4 
VEN 2709 23.7 GBR 8803 21.2 AGO 2709 22.3 SAU 2710 20.6 QAT 2709 22.4 
NGA 2709 23.5 DNK 9999 21.2 SAU 2709 22.3 KWT 2710 20.4 IDN 2711 22.3 
IRQ 2709 22.9 SAU 2709 20.7 OMN 2709 22.2 PHL 8542 20.3 KWT 2709 22.1 




Overreporting of exports 
 
Importer: 
USA Germany China United Kingdom Japan 
Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap 
DEU 8901 -19.9 CHN 8901 -20.3 HKG 8703 -20.8 USA 8803 -21.2 SWE 8802 -18.9 
FIN 8901 -19.9 BEL 0803 -19.8 HKG 4101 -19.3 DEU 8802 -21.0 SGP 2204 -18.5 
PRT 8802 -19.2 AUT 8901 -19.7 HKG 7108 -19.2 HKG 7108 -20.8 SGP 2208 -18.0 
MEX 8602 -19.1 DNK 2716 -19.1 JPN 7108 -18.6 CAN 7108 -20.7 NZL 2709 -17.9 








USA Germany China United 
Kingdom 
Japan All five importers 
Exporter Gap Exporter Gap Exporter Gap Exporter Gap Exporter Gap Exporter Gap 




14.9 Indonesia 12.1 Iraq 16.3 Equatorial 
Guinea 
12.6 
Lesotho 13.5 Indonesia 11.9 Congo 13.5 Lao PDR 11.5 Equatorial 
Guinea 
14.0 Indonesia 12.4 
Indonesia 13.3 Ukraine 11.4 Dem.Rep. 
of Congo 
12.7 Myanmar 11.5 Western 
Sahara 
13.7 Philippines 11.6 
Philippines 12.7 Philippines 11.2 Tchad 11.8 Bouvet 
Island 
11.4 Indonesia 13.2 Iraq 11.4 
Iraq 12.5 Serbia and 
Monte’gro 
11.0 Rwanda 11.8 Falkland 
Isds 









Table 3: Correlation of exporter-specific average trade gaps 
 
 
 USA Germany China UK Japan All 
USA 1.0000      
Germany 0.9245 1.0000     
China 0.8357 0.7824 1.0000    
United Kingdom 0.9368 0.9571 0.7986 1.0000   
Japan 0.9015 0.8572 0.8963 0.8582 1.0000  
All 5 importers 0.9700 0.9494 0.9120 0.9564 0.9548 1.0000 
 
Notes: 202 observations. 
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    -0.53* 
(0.22) 
(Log) Distance   0.76** 
(0.27) 




















(Log) GDP per 
capita exporter 














      
Observations 4770 4770 4362 4362 3324 
Adj. R2 0.17 0.18 0.09 0.26 0.20 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the average pair-wise trade gap. Importer and 
year fixed effects included, but not reported. Standard errors robust to clustering by exporter 
in parentheses. **, * and # denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the average pair-wise trade gap. The 
specification is similar to column (4) in Table 4; that is, the regression includes the following 
(unreported) controls: (log) distance, common border dummy, landlocked dummy exporter, 
(log) GDP per capita exporter, (log) area exporter. Importer and year fixed effects included, 
but not reported. Standard errors robust to clustering by exporter in parentheses. **, * and # 
denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Product-level evidence for exporter corruption 
 
 































































     
Observations 1,226,103 1,185,092 685,865 729,553 
Adj. R2 0.09 0.08 0.23 0.04 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the pair-wise trade gap at the 4-digit product 
level. Importer, product and year fixed effects included, but not reported. Standard errors 
robust to clustering by exporter in parentheses. **, * and # denote significant at the 1, 5 and 
10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Does exporter corruption matter only for values? 
 
 






























































     
Observations 4362 3324 4362 3324 
Adj. R2 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.18 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the average pair-wise trade gap in the measure 
that is reported in the first row of the table. Importer and year fixed effects included, but not 
reported. Standard errors robust to clustering by exporter in parentheses. **, * and # denote 




















    -0.01 
(0.05) 
(Log) Distance   0.30* 
(0.07) 




















(Log) GDP per 
capita importer 








     
      
Observations 5315 5307 4820 4820 4820 
Adj. R2 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the average pair-wise trade gap. Exporter and 
year fixed effects included, but not reported. Standard errors robust to clustering by importer 








USA Germany China United 
Kingdom 
Japan All five 
importers 
Product Gap Product Gap Product Gap Product Gap Product Gap Product Gap 
9999 10.6 7112 7.0 2709 10.7 9999 7.8 2709 9.9 2709 6.9 
9706 8.6 9704 6.7 8908 9.6 8411 6.8 2619 8.9 6110 5.0 
2709 7.2 2709 6.6 2615 7.2 2620 6.5 9999 8.2 4403 4.8 
6110 6.5 2607 6.3 8601 7.0 9706 6.1 2305 7.0 9999 4.8 
6102 6.2 9302 5.8 2518 6.8 7112 5.6 2711 6.5 6204 4.5 
            
Position of product code 9706 (1241 products): 







Table 10: Correlation of product-specific average trade gaps 
 
 
 USA Germany China UK Japan All 
USA 1.0000      
Germany 0.4347 1.0000     
China 0.1858 0.0558 1.0000    
United Kingdom 0.3426 0.2910 0.1581 1.0000   
Japan 0.4562 0.4685 0.2251 0.2539 1.0000  
All 5 importers 0.7292 0.6516 0.5376 0.6157 0.7381 1.0000 
 
Notes: 1240 observations. 
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  1.36* 
(0.57) 








     
Observations 804452 733507 25192 29067 
Adj. R2 0.39 0.11 0.06 0.05 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is reported in the first row of the table. Year fixed 
effects always included, but not reported. When appropriate, importer or country pair fixed 
effects are included, but not reported. Standard errors robust to clustering by product in 
parentheses. **, * and # denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Difference between log of import value (in current US dollar) recorded in the importing 
country and the corresponding log of exports (in current US dollar) recorded in exporting 
country at the 4-digit HS level 
Source: computed from UN Comtrade (http://comtrade.un.org) 
 
Corruption (WB) 
Control of corruption score 
Source: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators project (http://www.governance.org) 
 
Corruption (TI) 
Corruption perceptions index 
Source: Transparency International (http://www.transparency.org) 
 
(Log) Distance 
Log of bilateral distance (in km) based on coordinates for the geographic center of countries 
Source: based on data from CIA World Factbook 
(http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) 
 
Common border dummy 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when two countries share a common land border 
(and zero otherwise) 




Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when two countries share a common language (and 
zero otherwise) 
Source: based on data from CIA World Factbook 
(http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) 
 
(Log) GDP per capita 
Log of GDP per capita (in current US dollar) 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 
 
(Log) Area 
Log of surface area (in sq. km) 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 
 
Level of protection 
Total ad valorem equivalent tariff at the 4-digit HS level (in %) 
Source: UNCTAD/WTO International Trade Centre (http://www.macmap.org) 
 
Value/weight 
Trade value (in current US dollar) / Net weight (in kg) 
Source: computed from UN Comtrade (http://comtrade.un.org) 
 
Unit value 
Trade value (in current US dollar) / Trade quantity (in units) 
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